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POSITION OF LIENHOLDERS UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S NARCOTIC LAWS
By DAVID MATTHEW DOOLEY
For the past two decades, vehicles used in violation of the state narcotic
laws have been subjected to forfeiture to the State of Califorma.1 The usual
litigation concerning the vehicle includes not only a trial of the rights of
the culpable user, but as it is the general business practice for many of
these vehicles to be purchased on conditional sales contracts, the California
courts are forced to determine the rights of the conditional sales vendor,
or of some bank or finance company who has taken an assignment of the
contract.
Under Section 11620 of the California Health and Safety Code, such
forfeiture proceedings may be mitigated when the "claimant of any right,
title, or interest in the vehicle may prove his lien, mortgage, or conditional
sales contract to be bona fide, and that his right, title, or interest was cre-
ated after a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character,
and reputation of the purchaser, and without any knowledge that the vehi-
cle was being, or was to be used for the purpose charged.,"
In the Health and Safety Code, Section 11611, which provides for the
forfeiture of vehicles used in the illicit transportation of narcotics, and
Section 11620, which conditionally grants a right of remission to the inno-
cent lienholder, is found an illustration of the need (1) to prevent automo-
biles from being used in the distribution of narcotics, and (2) the protec-
tion of the interests of innocent lienholders.
Divergent Approaches of Other Legislative Bodies
Confronted with the facts that the dope racket is a multi-million dollar
business,' and statistics that though since 1930 the number of addicts has
been cut in half, yet in 1950 there were still 50,000 addicts,4 and that auto-
mobiles are being used in facilitating the distribution of drugs, legislative
bodies have taken two approaches.
The less stringent method of control is found more commonly on the
state level. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, which, by 1943, was enacted
in some 43 states, provides in Section 13 that a vehicle which is "resorted
to by narcotic drug addicts for the purpose of using narcotic drugs, or which
is used for the illegal keeping or selling or the same, shall be deemed a
common nuisance. And no one shall maintain a common nuisance." 5 There
is no specific provision in this statute for abatement of the nuisance.
Several states, though they have substantially adopted the Uniform
I. CALiw. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11611 (Deerng 1953).
2 CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11620 (Deenng 1953).
3 M. J. Pescor, Problem of Narcotic Drug Addiction, 43 J. CR . L. 471-481.
4 W Prosser, Narcotic Problem, 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 405-546.
I UNIFORm NARcoTic DRUG AcT § 13.
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Narcotic Drug Act, have repealed Section 13, and have followed the reme-
dial position taken by the Federal Government as to forfeiture. New York
provides for a forfeiture of vehicles, where by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, there is shown an intentional use by the owner in violation of the
narcotic laws." Iowa levies a forfeiture on any vehicle used in the trans-
portation of narcotics, or transportion by an occupant wherein the owner
has knowledge of such use.7 Nebraska has a similar statute.' North Caro-
lina confiscates vehicles in the same manner that they are forfeited under
the state liquor laws.9 And finally, under the provisions of the federal con-
traband laws (which include narcotics), any automobile which transports,
or facilitates the transportation of, or finally is used to conceal any contra-
band article, is made subject to forfeiture.'0
California, as above noted, takes the more severe approach. By an en-
actment in 1929, the legislature of California stated that vehicles used to
convey, carry, or transport illicit drugs, should be seized by any peace
officer and forfeited to the state.'
Forfeiture and Problems Peculiar to the Confiscation of
Automobiles
Instances are not uncommon, wherein the governing body of a society
finds need to enforce the view that all property is held under an implied
limitation that the owner's use shall not be injurious to the community
Under the Common Law, the property of a felon was forfeited upon con-
viction. In contemporary law, the Federal Government has provided that
adulterated or misbranded food and items of property which violate the
Custom laws are to be forfeited. Vehicles and other modes of transporta-
tion are confiscated when their use transgresses the laws governing liquor,
contraband articles, and counterfeit coins.-2
So, though the imposition of penalizing forfeitures is not novel, yet,
with the particular problem of confiscating automobiles, complications
arise. Since, as above stated, it is the general practice for many of the vehi-
cles to be purchased on conditional sales contracts, which are frequently,
in commercial practice, assigned to a bank or finance company, the for-
feiture proceedings affect the rights of these lienholders.
Protection of the Interests of Innocent Third Parties
Though there are numerous laws levying penalizing forfeitures, yet
there are fewer statutes whereby the innocent lienholder can mitigate the
6 McKNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAws OF NEW YORE: ANNOTATED, NEW YORE: PuBLIc HEALTH
LAWS, Bk. 44 § 3353 (1949).
7 CODE O IOWA, VOL. 1, c.204, § 14 (1950).
8 NEBRASKA REISSUE REVISED STATUTES OF 1943, c.28, § 472.01.
9 NORTH CAROLNA SESSION LAWS, 1953, c.903, § 5, p.815.
10 53 STAT. 1291 (1939), 64 STAT. 427 (1950), 49 U.S.C.A. 781-782.
11 CA=I. HEALTH AND SAE= CODE § 11611 (Deering 1953).
12 37 CJ.S. §3, p.6-7.
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forfeiture proceedings.
On the federal level, statutory provisions of remission are provided the
innocent lienholder who claims an interest in a vehicle forfeited because of
its use in violation of the federal liquor laws. If such claimant can show
compliance with the conditions set out in the act, he may modify the pro-
ceeding in his favor "
Where the use of an automobile transgresses the federal contraband
laws, which include narcotics, the vehicle is subject to confiscation, and the
third party claimant has no right to judicial hearing. 4 'In this instance,
the lienholder must pursue his interest by petitioning the Secretary of the
Treasury This administrative officer has the right to mitigate the forfeiture
proceedings on conditions that he finds are reasonable and just, if he finds
that the sale of the vehicle was incurred without willful negligence, or any
intention to defraud or violate the law "5 These exclusive powers of remis-
sion are not open to judicial review 16
The state legislatures have been similarly remiss in taking cogmzance
of the need to enact laws by which the innocent lienholder can adequately
follow a course of mitigation when an automobile is forfeited. Arizona has
a statute like California. 7 Under the Oregon Code, to make the confisca-
tion action subject to his claim, the lienholder must prove that he is an
owner in good faith, and without knowledge of the use or intended use.'
Georgia uses the terms "lack of knowledge, consent, or conivance. expressed
or implied" in allowing remission to the innocent third party-9 Pennsyl-
vania permits modification of the forfeiture action only when the lienholder
can show illicit use of the vehicle was without his consent or knowledge.'
Finally, though Nebraska provides for confiscation, no statutory rights
of mitigation are provided.2'
California's Approach to the Problem
That the California legislature has been aware of the rights of third
party claimants is evidenced by the legislative history of the laws relating
to such parties under forfeitures for the violation of the state narcotic laws.
In 1929, though vehicles were subjected to forfeiture, no provisions were
made for the innocent lienholder.2 2 It was not until four years later that
the conditions of mitigation, which now appear as Section 11620 of the
Health and Safety Code, were enacted.23
1349 STAT. 878 (1935), 18 U.S.C.A. 3617
14 See note 10 supra.
1546 STAT. 757 (1930), 19 U.S.C.A. 1618.
16 U.S. v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan, Motor # P-116329, Serial # 11569665, 73 F.Supp.
88, 89 (D.C.N.Y. 1946).
17 ARIZONA CODE, CUm. Supp., c.68, § 834a-h (1952).
18 OREGON REVISED STATUTES, vol. 3, § 471.655 at p.87 7
19 GEORGiA ACTS, 1952, pp.201-204.
2 0
PENNSyLVANiA LAWS, 1941, c.121, pp.263-2 6 6.
21 See note 8 supra.
22 See note 11 supra.
23 CA.I. STAT., 1933, c.253, § 3, p.788.
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In reviewing the cases involving Section 11620, the California courts
have construed its elements as imposing an affirmative duty with which the
lienholder must show compliance; and the requirement of a reasonable in-
vestigation of the purchaser's moral responsibility, character, and reputa-
tion has been judicially deemed a condition precedent to any right to remis-
sion. This construction, the courts have said, followed from the statutory
phrasing, that ". the claimant of any . interest may prove... [his
interest] to be bona fide and that such interest . was created after
a reasonable investigation., and without any knowledge of the use, or
intended use . "and, "In the event of such proof, the Court shall order
the automobile released "2-
The conclusion that compliance with the statutory conditions is para-
mount to any third party's claim has been strengthened by a recent Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruling in which the rights of a lienholder were denied.
The case was decided in a five-to-two decision. The majority held that even
though the evidence proved that at the time of the sale of the automobile,
the purchaser's moral character and reputation were good, and that the
investigation would have gained nothing of a derogatory nature concern-
ing him, still the investigation had to be made.25 A strong dissenting opinion
was written by Justice Carter, in which the reasoning of the District Court
of Appeal was followed.' Justice Carter reasoned that since the burden of
an investigation was placed on the claimant only to keep automobiles from
possible use by violators of the narcotics laws, those persons of ill repute
in the community, it would be imposing a useless act to require an inves-
tigation, where such an investigation would give forth nothing to place the
claimant on notice. Indeed, it would be requiring an idle act, which flouts
the opinion that the law does not require idle acts. This latter conclusion
finds sympathy in several federal decisions relating to violations of the
federal liquor law, which law also requires a statutory investigation.27
When any statute is so broad and embodies such terms as "reasonable
investigation," "moral responsibility," and "character and reputation," it
is necessarily open to wide judicial interpretation, when reviewing the par-
ticular facts of each case.
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of California in People
v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle' ruled that the mere verification by
the employer of the purchaser's employment without checking any of the
other references was insufficient. The courts then went on to determine
2 4 People v. One Pontiac 8 Sedan, Eng. # 8-73976, 22 CalApp.2d 503, 71 P.2d 302 (1937),
accord: People v. One La Salle Sedan, 23 CalApp.2d 273, 72 P.2d 766 (1937) ; People v. One
1938 Ford Sedan, 98 CalApp.2d 333, 219 P.2d 839 (1950), People v. One 1949 Ford V-8 Coupe,
Eng. # 98BA871412, 41 A.C. 124, 257 P.2d 641 (1953).
25 People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, 36 Cal.2d 471, 224 P.2d 677 (1950).
26 People v. One Ford V-8 Coupe, 217 P.2d 458 (1950).
27 U.S. v. One 1939 Model DeSoto Coupe, Motor #S6-27,687, 119 F.2d 516, 519 (10th
Cir. 1941). U.S. v. One 1935 Ford Standard Coach, Auto Motor # 18-179962, 13 F.Supp. 104
(D.C. Tenn. 1935).
28 People v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 5 CaI.2d 188, 53 P.2d 970 (1936).
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that mere financial inquiries were not sufficient. In People v. One Lincoln
Eight,' such an investigation as the aforementioned was not bolstered by
statements of the personal references that the prospect "was a good ole
soak."
In 1937, an Appellate Court ruled that a financial investigation coupled
with information received from the employer of the purchaser as to his
occupation, length of service, and recommendations of a favorable char-
acter and reputation, was sufficient to sustain the burden imposed by the
statute on the lienholder3 In the same year, the condemnation of a purely
financial investigation was modified, when the court in People v. One Ford
V8 Coach," ruled in favor of the claimant, who based his inquiry on a
Dun & Bradstreet report, which also gave the marital status, business ad-
dress, previous employment, type of present trade, and general favorable
recommendations as to character. Personal acquaintances and knowledge
of the vendee and his family over an extended period have been held suf-
ficient as meeting the statutory requirements as to investigation.32
In 1941, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, decided what has
since become the leading case on the minimum elements required by the
statutory inquiry Writing the opinion, Judge Pullen stated that a bona
fide investigation should reveal "the home address of the prospect, his em-
ployer, past or present, his source of income, his family and social connec-
tions, and in the case of a stranger, some inquiry as to his prior location
and standing in the community ))33
That the investigation must be reasonable and bona fide was empha-
sized in People v One 1940 Buick 8, Eng No 74019475,"4 wherein the
statements by the purchaser as to his home address and employment were
contradicted by a subsequent credit association's information. With this
discrepancy, the court held that the investigation could not be deemed
reasonable when viewed by a prudent man. But in another case, the reason-
ableness and good faith of the investigation rendered were not insufficient,
nor was the claimant placed on notice of moral irresponsibility because of
information that the prospect had been a card dealer.3"
So, with the aforementioned decisions, the California courts have given
Section 11620 of the Health and Safety Code a more limited construction
2 9 People v. One 1939 Buick 8 Coupe, Eng. #43787923, 43 Cal.App.2d 4ii, 110 P.2d 1013
(1941). Beverly Finance Co. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.2d 381, 246 P.2d 142 (1952).
People v One Packard 6 Touring Sedan, 26 Cal.App.2d 150, 79 P.2d 130 (1938). People v. One
Lncoln Eght, 12 Cal.App.2d 662, 55 P.2d 925 (1936).
8o People v. One Plymouth Sedan, Eng. # PG 45999, 21 Cal.App.2d 715, 69 P.2d 1011
(1937).
3 1 People v. One Ford V-8 Coach, Eng. # 18-2187132, 21 CalApp.2d 445, 69 P.2d 473
(1937).
3 2 People v. One 1939 Plymouth 6 Coupe, 41 Cal.App.2d 559, 107 P.2d 266 (1940).
33 People v. One 1939 Buick 8 Coupe, supra note 29.
34 People v. One 1940 Buick 8 Sedan, Eng. # 74019475, 70 CalApp.2d 542, 161 P.2d 264
(1945).
35 People v. One 1933 Buick Sedan, 43 CalApp.2d 482, 111 P.2d 378 (1941).
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than was found in the rather broad original statutory language. The courts
have decided that the investigation has to be made prior to the creation of
any interest, and have laid the essential elements of what a reasonable
inquiry should be.
At the time of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia has not as yet resolved the conflicting decisions of the Appellate
Courts on another important question that arises in the forfeiture proceed-
ings. The question presents itself when the claimant is the subsequent as-
signee of the conditional sales contract, or, in more common parlance, the
bank or finance company that "picks up" the vehicle ownership certificate.
In 1940, the Appellate Court decided that the subsequent lienholder could
not rely on the previous investigation made by the original vendor, because
this would lead to sellers assigning their interests to relieve themselves of
liability 3s In a later case involving the same point, People v. One 1949
Ford Tudor Sedan17 the court criticized the earlier case, stating that the
fearful consequences of relieving liability after an insufficient investiga-
tion by assigning away the contract did not exist. Justice Peters, who wrote
the opinion, said:
. assuming the investigation of [the assignor] was sufficient to protect
it, such investigation would protect [the assignee] either because the results
of such investigation were in fact communicated to it by [the assignor] or,
if not so communicated, then such communication was not necessary "39
Some Practical Aspects
It thus appears that the courts have given a construction to Section
11620 of the Health and Safety Code, which places an affirmative duty on
the vendors of automobiles and on their assignees, banks and finance com-
panies. This duty is a heavy burden. When viewed in the light of a sound
public policy, in which the legislature and the courts must find an equili-
brium between the resultant benefits to the public and the hardship to rela-
tively fewer innocent parties, the attributes of the penal provisions of such
a statute are questionable.
Since the language of Section 11620 gave the judiciary such broad and
initially blunt instruments, the courts were obliged to hone them with their
own thinking; and beginning with the leading decision written by Judge
Pullen,3" they have given the statute definite sharpness. The result has been
that the reasonable investigation as judicially determined, requires the
questioning of the prospect's friends, neighbors, and business associates.
People have an innate aversion to answering personal questions, involving
the determination of the moral conduct of one whom they know Hence, it
86People v. One 1938 Buick Sedan, Eng. #43502146, 39 CalApp.2d 42, 102 P.2d 447
(1940).
37 People v. One 1949 Ford Tudor Sedan, 115 Ca App.2d 157, 251 P.2d 776 (1952).
88 Ibid., 115 CalApp.2d 157 at 165, 251 P.2d 776 at 781.
89 People v. One 1939 Buick 8 Coupe, supra note 29.
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is common knowledge that great difficulty is encountered in making such
inquiries. Ordinarily the most that an investigator will glean will be replies
in the negative-that the person being questioned knows nothing of a de-
rogatory nature concerning the purchaser. Although such statements have
been ruled upon as being sufficient to constitute a reasonable investiga-
tion,40 can they be valued a true determination of the person's moral respon-
sibility, character, and reputation? Is not such an investigation merely a
perfunctory compliance with the letter of the statute and a disregard of its
intent, to-wit, the prevention of the transportation, or keeping of narcotics
in vehicles.
Moreover, the good will of the vendor making the investigation might
be seriously impaired when the purchaser learns he is being subject to such
an investigation. To say the least, a purchaser would be concerned, if not
outright insulted, to know that an investigation was being conducted to
determine from his friends and associates whether he was stigmatized as a
person of ill reputation, and a possible dope addict or peddler This is not
too far-fetched, if one considers that people generally dislike even a routine
financial investigation.
Again, the duty of an investigation weighs heavily, because some of the
narcotic enforcement agencies deny any right of access to the records of
drug violations on the basis that such information is of a confidential
nature.4
Statistically speaking, the imposition of a duty of inquiry is dispropor-
tionately burdensome. For those automobile dealers, banks, and finance
companies which operate in the larger metropolitan areas, it is more prob-
able that the purchaser will use the vehicle in violation of the narcotic laws
because of the more intensified use of drugs in these highly populated
regions.
Notice should also be taken of the financial imposition of the statute
that is presently required in making the reasonable investigation. Further-
more, it cannot be gainsaid that in the usual course of business the finance
companies or banks practically never see the purchaser. They deal solely
with their assignor, the vendor of the automobile, and therefore do not have
the opportunity of making a personal appraisal of the purchaser.
In summary, the elements of Section 11620 of the California Health
and Safety Code are highly penal and impose a burden of an extraordinary
nature on a highly useful and lawful business transaction. 42
The consequence of the statute as it is now applied, are that the vendors,
banks, and automobile finance companies in many instances do not make
the required investigation, and simply take the risk that the vehicle will not
4 0 People v. One 1941 Cadillac Club Coupe, 63 Cal.App.2d 418, 147 P.2d 49 (1944).4 1 Supra note 34. Here records were denied because of wartime regulations of the Merchant
Manne. Today, the California State Narcotic Enforcement Bureau refuses information on the
basis that it is of a confidential nature.
42 People v. One 1941 Cadillac Club Coupe, supra note 40.
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be used in violation of the narcotic laws. The nature of the transaction
demands speed in closing and if delay is encountered, the business is usu-
ally lost.
It is readily understandable that in its never ending struggle to control
the unauthorized use of narcotics, it is the relentless policy of the law to
forfeit vehicles used in the transportation of narcotics,4" yet contrary to
that doctrine, is the statement that sweeping forfeiture statutes fail to
establish a standard of conduct that will save the rights of an innocent
claimant. Under such statutes, the bona fide attempts to avoid penalty may
also result in the curtailment of socially desirable activities.44 It appears
that the present construction given Section 11620 falls within the condem-
nation of this last statement.
Since this is so, the statutory rights given to the innocent lienholder
should undergo a major revision. The basis for this proposal lies in the fore-
going statements and on certain facts as determined by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. This agency found that it could be definitely concluded
that the narcotic addict is more than twice as likely to have a criminal record
prior to the first infraction of the narcotic laws; and that the addiction to
drugs shows up as a later phase of criminal career, rather than as a pre-
disposing factor; and that in the procession of events, it is from criminality
to addiction, or from a defective personality to criminality to addiction.45
The revision of Section 11620 along lines similar to those found under
the rights to remission of the lienholder, when vehicles are used in violation
of the federal liquor laws appears to be highly desirable. Under this statute,
mitigation of forfeitures is allowed when the claimant can show he made
an investigation, prior to the creation of his interest, to the federal, state,
or local law enforcement officers concerning the character and reputation
of the prospect, and particularly as to any record concerning violations of
the liquor laws.46 If the California statute so provided for inquiries to be
made of the federal and state law enforcement agencies concerning the
record of any criminal activity, and particularly narcotic violations, the
duty of investigation would not be penalizing; and since lienholders "usu-
ally make a financial investigation, it would be no hardship for them to
make a check to see if the purchaser had a criminal record so far as it [is]
a matter of public record."' 7
4 3 People v. One 1949 Cadillac 4-Door Sedan, ........ CalApp.2d- ....... 272 P.2d 873 (1954).
44 50 CoL. L. REv. 375-379.
45 See note 4 supra.
46 Supra note 13, and the courts have decided that the general character and reputation
of the prospect is to be determined by the agencies as set out m the Act, rather than as
determined by the general community- U.S. v. One 1940 Ford Coach Automobile, Motor
# 18-5885613, 43 F.Supp. 593 (D.C. Ky. 1942).
47 Note, 33 IIL. L. REv. 233-236.
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